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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAWN ALUMBAUGH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, i 
vs. : Case No. 920656-CA 
UTAH STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, 
by and through its Commissioner : 
and Authorized Representative, 
HAROLD C. YANCEY, : Category No. 15 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE UTAH STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court of Utah under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 
1992). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1992), and 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992), this Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal by reason of the transfer of this 
action from the Supreme Court of Utah to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Has Dawn Alumbaugh failed to exhaust her administrative 
remedies? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon a 
motion to dismiss, and the material facts are not in dispute. 
Because this issue raises only questions of law, the' Court should 
give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a 
correctness standard. City of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co. . 796 
P.2d 697 (Utah 1990). 
2. Are Dawn Alumbaugh's contractual and constitutional claims, 
alleging failure to afford adequate due process, ripe for judicial 
consideration when the procedural process being chall-enged has not 
been concluded? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
3. Is the State of Utah, and its Insurance Department, 
"persons" such as can be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
4. Does a private, civil, cause of action exist under Article 
1, Section 7, for a state employee to sue her employer for alleged 
constitutional violations? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review i§ the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
5. Has Dawn Alumbaugh, a merit employee, failed to state a 
contractual cause of action against her employer, the State of 
Utah? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1989) 
A Claim against the state, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the attorney general and the agency 
concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any 
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extension of time granted under Section 63-30-
11, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19 (1989) 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff 
shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by 
the court, but in no case less than the sum of 
$300/ conditioned upon the payment by the 
plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the 
governmental entity in the action if the 
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or 
fails to recover judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Dawn Alumbaugh/ an employee of the Defendant, Utah State 
Insurance Department, commenced an administrative grievance 
proceeding with her employer concerning Alumbaugh's transfer to a 
new position, at the same payf within the Department. When Ms. 
Alumbaugh appealed the denial of that grievance to the Career 
Service Review Board/ the Administrator issued a summary decision 
dismissing the appeal on the grounds that the Board did not have 
jurisdiction to hear Ms. Alumbaugh's appeal. R. 47-54. Alumbaugh 
sought judicial review of that dismissal in this Court. In 
Alumbaugh v. White. 800 P. 2d 825 (Utah App. 1990), this Court 
determined that/ in as much as the challenged administrative action 
was an informal proceeding, that this Court transferred the action 
to the District Court, where it should have been brought initially. 
While her petition for judicial review was proceeding in the 
trial court, Ms. Alumbaugh then brought this action in the District 
Court as well. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to 
dismiss on the basis of Dawn Alumbaugh's failure to exhaust her 
3 
administrative and statutory remedies• R. 123-4. Plaintiff then 
filed the instant appeal. R. 125-6. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Plaintiff was employed by the Utah State Department of 
Insurance as a Grade 15 Insurance Technician in the Department's 
Solvency Division. R. 65 at para. 2. On or about April 3, 1990, 
Ms. Alumbaugh was transferred to a Grade 15 Insurance Technician 
position in the Department's Market Conduct Division. R. 67-8 at 
para. 8. 
On or about April 6, 1990, Ms. Alumbaugh filed an 
administrative grievance challenging this transfer as being 
involuntary. R. 68 at para. 9. The State of Utah's Department of 
Insurance denied that grievance. When Ms. Alumbaugh appealed the 
denial of that grievance to the Career Service Review Board, the 
Administrator issued a summary decision dismissing the appeal on 
the grounds that the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear Ms. 
Alumbaugh's appeal. R. 47-54. 
Alumbaugh sought judicial review of that dismissal in this 
Court. In Alumbaugh v. White, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1990), this 
Court determined that, in as much as the challenged administrative 
action was an informal proceeding, that this Court transferred the 
action to the District Court, where it should have been brought 
initially. 
Without awaiting a final resolution of her grievance 
procedure, plaintiff filed the instant action alleging that her 
constitutional rights to due process were violated under both the 
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federal and state constitutions. The sole defendant in this action 
is the "Utah State Insurance Department."1 R. 64 at para. 2. This 
action was assigned to Judge Richard H. Moffat. Judge Moffat 
dismissed the instant action on July 10, 1992 without prejudice 
because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her remedies in her 
prior action before Judge Young before filing this separate action. 
Ms. Alumbaugh's petition for judicial review of the 
administrative grievance process has yet to be resolved., Ms. 
Alumbaugh, after the dismissal of the instant action, obtained the 
dismissal without prejudice of her petition for judicial review 
"for the reason that Alumbaugh wishes to hold such Petition in 
abeyance pending the determination of her rights in this Appeal." 
Brief of Appellant at page 15, para. 28. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Dawn Alumbaugh, a merit employee of the State of Utah, filed 
an administrative grievance concerning that employment. When that 
grievance had progressed to the judicial review stage, and before 
the process was completed, Ms. Alumbaugh filed the instant action 
alleging that her contractual, state, and federal constitutional 
rights to due process had been violated by the manner in which her 
grievance was handled. 
The instant action is premature, and was properly dismissed 
1
 While the caption of the instant action alleges that the 
Defendant Utah State Insurance Department is being sued "by and 
through its Commissioner and Authorized Representative HAROLD C. 
YANCEY," the complaint, amended complaint, and the brief of 
appellant all make it very clear that the one and only defendant in 
this matter is the State of Utah's Department of Insurance. 
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pending Ms. Alumbaugh's exhaustion of her administrative remedies. 
Until a final decision is reached in plaintiff's administrative 
matter, this Court is left to speculate and conjecture as to what 
due process will have been afforded the plaintiff. Where, as here, 
a plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the administrative due 
process she has been afforded, her claim is not justiciable until 
the challenged proceedings are final and complete. 
The "Utah State Insurance Department," the only defendant, is 
not a person as that term is used in section 1983 • F o r this 
reason, the plaintiff's civil rights cause of action was properly 
dismissed. 
No private cause of action exists under the State of Utah's 
Constitution for a claim by a merit employee that she has been 
denied her rights to procedural due process in an administrative 
grievance hearing. The legislature has expressly provided for 
judicial review of such hearings. This is the existing avenue for 
addressing such claims of constitutional wrongdoing. 
As a civil service merit employee, Ms. Alumbaugh's employment 
is governed by statute, and not an alleged implied contract. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF'S INSTANT ACTION WAS PROPERLY 
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND BECAUSE HER CLAIMS 
ARE NOT YET RIPE FOR JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION 
All of the plaintiff's claims arise out the same actions and 
allegations that were properly before the Third District Court, the 
Honorable David S. Young, in plaintiff's petition for judicial 
review of her grievance proceeding. That matter is now "in 
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abeyance," due to the plaintiff's actions, pending the outcome of 
the instant appeal. It has not been finally adjudicated. Judge 
Moffat correctly dismissed the instant action as being premature. 
The issues raised in this action cannot fully be addressed until 
the prior judicial review action is completed. Until such time as 
that judicial review process has been completed, the instant action 
before Judge Moffat was not ripe for judicial determination. Judge 
Moffat correctly dismissed this action without prejudice for this 
reason, and such dismissal should be affirmed, now, on appeal, for 
the same reason. 
The issues of fact and law that the plaintiff raised in the 
instant proceeding, are of necessity the same or similar to those 
that are raised in her petition for judicial review. This Supreme 
Court of Utah has held that administrative remedies must be 
exhausted before a party may bring an independent judicial action. 
Hi-Country Homeowners v. PSC of Utah, 779 P.2d 682 (Utah 1989). 
See also; State, Dept. of Social Services v. Hiqqs, 656 P.2d 998 
(Utah 1982), Levie v. Sevier County, 617 P.2d 331 (Utah 1980), 
Hatch v. Utah County Planning Dept., 685 P.2d 550 (Utah 1984). 
The instant action is duplicative. The key issues of fact and 
law that are presented by this action will be decided in the 
petition for judicial review. No final determination in that 
action has been made. It has instead been placed on hold pending 
the result in this action. Until the review process has been 
completed, there can be no complete set of facts upon which to 
adjudicate the instant action. A controversy is not ripe for 
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judicial determination unless the facts on which a legal decision 
is demanded have accrued, "The court will not declare rights on 
facts which have not arisen or adjudicate matters which are 
contingent, uncertain, or rest in the future." 26 C.J.S. 
Declaratory Judgments § 28 at pages 103-104. 
In her instant, second, action, the plaintiff alleges that she 
was denied due process under both the constitutions of the United 
States and of the State of Utah. Such a claim cannot be ripe for 
independent judicial adjudication until the original review of the 
administrative proceeding she challenges is completed. The 
plaintiff's petition for judicial review of her grievance action 
has not been prosecuted to a final result. It has not been 
concluded. The facts as to what due process has been afforded the 
plaintiff are still contingent and uncertain. The facts may very 
well change as the petition for judicial review moves through the 
courts. It was premature for the plaintiff to file the instant, 
independent, action before a final resolution was had in her prior 
proceeding. 
A fundamental principle of judicial review is 
that, when possible, we refrain from deciding 
constitutional questions. This is especially 
true when there is no factual record before 
us. 
State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1990) 
(citations omitted). No complete factual record concerning due 
process could be obtained in this action until the prior petition 
for judicial review reaches a final adjudication. Until that time 
the court is left with conjecture and speculation as the only means 
8 
of determining what exact due process will have been afforded to 
the plaintiff. 
In Neighborhood Ass'n v. Planning & Zoning Com'n, 888 F.2d 
1573 (11th Cir. 1989) the court affirmed a dismissal of procedural 
due process claims on the grounds that those claims were not yet 
ripe. As in the instant action, the plaintiffs in Neighborhood had 
brought their civil rights action before completing the procedural 
process that they alleged was defective. 
The final outcome of plaintiff's administrative and judicial 
review proceeding is still unknown. The courts, in the judicial 
review proceeding, may yet: remand that matter to the 
administrative body for further hearings, reverse the 
administrative decision, or affirm the administrative decision. 
Until the judicial review petition filed by the ,plaintiff is 
resolved, her effort to file a second, independent, matter was 
premature and was correctly dismissed by Judge Moffat as being 
premature and for failure to exhaust her available remedies. 
The only case law cited by the plaintiff, in her effort to 
claim that she does not need to complete the administrative 
proceeding in order to present a complete factual situation as to 
what due process was provided, is Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 828 P.2d 1071 (Utah App. 1992). Plaintiff does not specify 
how this Court's opinion applies to the present action, but simply 
claims that it supports her arguments. Hatton-Ward involved the 
question of whether a former employee must first file an 
administrative grievance before filing an independent action under 
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the whistle blower statute, Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-1, et seq.. 
This Court held that, as an independent cause of action, there was 
no requirement that an administrative grievance be filed before 
proceeding under the whistle blower statute. In Hatton-Ward the 
plaintiff did not claim that his rights had been violated by the 
manner in which any administrative proceeding was taken against 
him. The plaintiff instead claimed that his termination was 
contrary to an independent statutory provision. 
Further, in Hatton-Ward, the Court expressly pointed out that 
Mr. Hatton-Ward was not seeking reinstatement or any other relief 
related to the administrative grievance process. Instead, it was 
the defendant who claimed that the plaintiff must first go through 
the administrative process before filing a separate, distinct, 
cause of action unrelated in any manner to the administrative 
process. But Ms. Alumbaugh, rather than bringing an entirely 
-separate cause of action, is instead claiming that she was denied 
contractual, state, and federal constitutional due process in. the 
administrative grievance process. 
Plaintiff alleges that her constitutional and contractual 
rights to due process were violated by the manner in which the 
prior administrative proceeding was handled. Her current, second, 
action alleges that the administrative process she was given 
violated her constitutional rights under both the state and federal 
constitutions, and her contractual rights under an implied 
employment contract. Unlike a claim under the whistle blower 
statute, the current action of necessity is intertwined and 
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entangled in the facts and law that is applicable to the 
administrative proceeding. Because that process is not yet 
completed, but is "in abeyance" awaiting a final resolution of this 
matter before plaintiff completes her petition for judicial review, 
any claim that such an ongoing process has violated her rights is 
premature and has not yet ripened into a justiciable controversy. 
Plaintiff tries to avoid this conclusion by seeking to 
downplay the importance of her ongoing petition for judicial review 
of the administrative process. Plaintiff claims that her current 
attorney has determined that even if she prevails in her prior 
action, that no meaningful relief would be available. This belief 
does not alter the fact that the instant action is premature. It 
doesn't change the reality that the facts upon which the current 
action is based are still contingent, uncertain, and rest on the 
future course of proceedings in plaintiff's petition for judicial 
review that is still outstanding. It simply raises questions about 
why the prior action is being pursued if plaintiff feels that it is 
meaningless. 
II. THE STATE OF UTAH AND ITS DEPARTMENT OF 
INSURANCE ARE NOT 'PERSONS' PURSUANT TO 42 
U.S.C. S 1983 SUCH AS CAN BE SUED 
The Amended Complaint alleges violations of the Plaintiff's 
civil rights and seeks recovery pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. It is 
clearly established law that neither the State of Utah or its 
Department of Insurance are "persons" pursuant to §1983 and cannot 
therefore be sued thereunder. 
In its most recent case, the United States Supreme Court made 
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it abundantly clear that the several states cannot be sued under 
§1983 in state courts. In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 
109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989), the Court held that the State of Michigan 
and its department of state police could not be sued in Michigan 
State Court for civil rights violations. 
Our conclusion is further supported by our 
holdings that in enacting §1983, Congress did 
not intend to override well-established 
immunities or defenses under the common law. 
"One important assumption underlying -the 
court's decisions in this area is that members 
of the 42nd Congress were familiar with 
common-law principles, including defenses 
previously recognized in ordinary tort 
litigation, and that they likely intended 
these common-law principles to obtain, absent 
specific provisions to the contrary." 
(Citations omitted). The doctrine of 
sovereign immunity was a familiar doctrine at 
common law. "The principle is elementary that 
a State cannot be sued in its own courts 
without its consent," It is an "established 
principle of jurisprudence" that the sovereign 
cannot be sued in its own courts without its 
consent. We cannot conclude that §1983 was 
intended to disregard the well-established 
immunity of a State from being sued without 
its consent. 
109 S.Ct. at 2309-2310, citations omitted. The State of Utah has 
expressly declared that it does not waive its immunity as to civil 
rights claims. §63-30-10(1)(b) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
Therefore, the State of Utah and the Utah State Insurance 
Department were properly dismissed from this action as far as 
allegations of violations of Section 1983 are contained in the 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. 
Plaintiff erroneously states that the State of Utah, or its 
Department of Insurance, can be named a defendant in this action 
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for the limited purpose of prospective injunctive relief and for 
the award of attorneys fees. The United States Supreme Court has 
continuously held that the states are not subject to such actions, 
regardless of the nature of the relief sought. Atascadero State 
Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 105 S.Ct. 3142, reh. den. 106 
S.Ct. 18 (1985); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 
465 U.S. 89, (1984); Florida Department of Health v. Florida 
Nursing Home Association, 450 U.S. 147 (1981); Alabama v. Pugh, 
438 U.S. 781 (1978); and Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933). 
Indeed, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) expressly held that 
the State of Kentucky could not be brought into a damages action 
against one of its employees for the sole purpose of an award of 
attorneys fees. 
Plaintiff seeks to circumvent this well established point of 
law by claiming that "injunctive relief may be ordered against a 
state under Section 1983. Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. at 71, note 
10." Brief of Appellant at page 23. The footnote cited by Ms. 
Alumbaugh does not state that a sovereign state is a "person" as 
that term is used under section 1983. Instead, the footnote points 
out, in part, that: 
Of course a State official in his or her 
official capacity, when sued for injunctive 
relief, would be a person under § 1983 because 
"official-capacity actions for prospective 
relief are not treated as actions against the 
State." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S., at 167, 
n. 14, 105 S.Ct., at 3106, n. 14; Ex Parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160, 28 S.Ct. 441, 
453-454, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). This 
distinction is "commonplace in sovereign 
immunity doctrine," . . . . 
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Id.. The footnote clearly does not support plaintiff's claim that 
the State of Utah, or its Department of Insurance, would be a 
"person" such as can be sued under section 1983 for prospective 
relief. Ms. Alumbaugh has not sought to bring an official capacity 
action against the appropriate state officials. 
The only defendant has always been the "Utah State Insurance 
Department." It has been clearly decided by the courts that a 
state's agencies are entitled to the same immunity as is the state 
itself. See Schaefer v. Wilcock, 676 F.Supp. 1092, 1097-1098 (D. 
Utah) (dismissing action against the Utah Highway Patrol); Alabama 
v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (State Department of Corrections); 
Hamilton v. Menqel, 629 F.Supp. 1110, 1113 (D. Utah 1986) 
(dismissing action against Utah State Tax Commission); Richins v. 
Industrial Construction, Inc., 502 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1974) 
(reversing award of damages against Utah State Road Commission). 
III. PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7 
OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
Alumbaugh's Third Cause of Action seeks to allege a private, 
civil, cause of action for a purported violation of Article 1, 
Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution, which states that "No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law.•• 
Plaintiff's state law cause of action, if any, against the 
State of Utah's Insurance Department is subject to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, which provides at Utah Code Ann. §63-30-
12: 
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A claim against the state, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the Attorney General and the agency 
concerned within one year after the claim 
arises. • . . 
The statutory language above is clear and unambiguous. Where, as 
here, suit is brought against an agency of the State of Utah, a 
condition precedent to bringing suit is the filing of a timely 
notice of claim with the State agency involved and the Office of 
the Attorney General. If this is not done, suit is barred. 
It is undisputed that the record in the instant action shows 
that no notice of claim was filed with the Office of the Attorney 
General or with the agency concerned before this action was 
commenced. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has ruled on numerous occasions that 
full compliance with the requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act is essential to maintain a cause of action thereunder. 
In Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 
1975), the Court addressed the statute that mandates the filing of 
a timely notice of claim when suing a political subdivision of the 
State of Utah. §63-30-13 Utah Code Ann. is virtually identical to 
§63-30-12. 
In dismissing an action against a School District where the 
notice of claim was not filed in a timely manner, the Court 
explained: 
The School District is a political subdivision 
of the state. Therefore it would normally be 
immune from suit; and the right to sue is an 
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exception created by statute. We have 
consistently held that where a cause of action 
is based upon a statute, full compliance with 
its requirements is a condition precedent to 
the right to maintain a suit. 
Id. at 482. See also, Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 £.2d 925, 926 
(Utah 1977); Sears v. Southworth v. State, 563 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 
1977); Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 
1286 (1973). 
The Supreme Court of Utah has also ruled that the failure 
to allege compliance with the notice requirement, as the Plaintiff 
has failed to do in the instant action, may constitute a separate 
ground f<?r dismissal. Roosendaal Construction and Mining 
Corporation v. Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972). 
Applying these cases to the instant action, the State of Utah 
submits that plaintiff has failed to comply with section 63-30-12. 
Plaintiff needed to file notices of claim with both* the Attorney 
'General's Office and the agency concerned. This she has failed to 
do. This shortcoming deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over 
plaintiff's claims against the State of Utah's Insurance Department 
and this action was properly dismissed. 
Plaintiff's claims are also subject to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-
19, which provides: 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff 
shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by 
the court, but in no case less than the sum of 
$300, conditioned upon the payment by the 
plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the 
governmental entity in the action if the 
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or 
fails to recover judgment. 
Where, as here, suit is brought against the State of Utah, a 
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condition precedent to bringing suit is the filing of the 
statutorily mandated undertaking. If this is not done, suit is 
barred. 
While not binding upon this Court, the State of Utah calls 
this Court's attention to the decision of the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Rippstein v. City of Provo, 929 F.2d 576 (10th Cir. 
1991). In Rippstein, the federal appellate court held that the 
undertaking required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19 must be filed 
contemporaneously with the complaint in order to be timely filed 
under this statute. Because the plaintiff in Rippstein did not so 
file an undertaking, but only sought to file one at a later time, 
the action was dismissed. The Court held that the failure to file 
could not be remedied by an attempt to file an undertaking late. 
At no time in the instant action, did plaintiff seek to file 
the required undertaking. For this reason, plaintiff's claims 
against the State of Utah were properly dismissed.2 
Even disregarding the State of Utah's sovereign immunity, 
Alumbaugh has failed to state a cause of action under this 
constitutional provision. The provision does not establish a 
separate, constitutional, cause of action for civil damages. The 
Utah State Legislature, and not Ms. Alumbaugh, has the 
constitutional mandate to determine how to enforce this provision. 
That Ms. Alumbaugh wishes that the Legislature had provided a civil 
2
 While Plaintiff's failure to comply with the requirements 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act were not addressed below, 
this is a jurisdictional question that can be raised at any time in 
the proceeding by either party or the court. LaMarr v. Utah State 
Dept. of Transportation, 828 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah App. 1992). 
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remedy is of no consequence. 
In support of her claim that such a direct cause of action 
exists under the Utah State Constitution, plaintiff cites to a 
single case, Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 
1980). Defendant is perplexed, to say the least, by Ms. 
Alumbaugh's reliance on this case. At no time does the majority 
decision in Worrall even cite to Article 1, Section .7 of the Utah 
State Constitution, as far as defendant has been able to determine. 
Worrall was a petition for judicial review of an administrative 
determination to fire an Ogden City fireman in which the Court held 
that the due process afforded in the administrative proceeding had 
not met the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. 
At no time did either the majority or dissenting opinions 
address the question of the whether or not Article 1, Section 7 of 
the Utah State Constitution created a private constitutional tort 
action. The only citation to this section in Worrall that the 
State of Utah is aware of is footnote two of the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Hall. .Id. at page 602. 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur, of Narc, 
403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United 
States did, indeed, create a federal cause of action directly under 
the federal constitution for damages against a federal officer who 
violates an individual's constitutional rights. At no time did 
Bivens create any cause of action against state officers or 
employees. 
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Indeed, not all federal officers are susceptible to Bivens 
actions. In Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362 
(1983), the Court refused to create a Bivens action for enlisted 
military personnel against their superior officers. In reaching 
this decision, the Court explained: 
This Court's holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
supra, authorized a suit for damages against 
federal officials whose actions violate an 
individual's constitutional rights, even 
though Congress had not expressly authorized 
such suits. The Court, in Bivens and its 
progeny, has expressly cautioned, however, 
that such a remedy will not be available when 
"special factors counselling hesitation" are 
present. 
462 U.S. at 298. In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 19, 100 S.Ct. 1468 
(1980) the Court explained that a second reason for not creating 
such a direct cause of action judicially was where the legislature 
had explicitly acted and created a substitute cause of action that 
is meaningful and adequate. 
The majority of federal courts, following Bivens, have held 
that where a plaintiff has an appropriate statutory remedy 
available for an alleged violation of a constitutional provision, 
no cause of action may be brought directly under the constitution.3 
Whether a plaintiff actually maintains or prevails on an action 
3
 See Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496 (6th Cir.), reh'g on 
other grounds 829 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1987); Williams v. Bennett, 
689 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1982), cert, den., 464 U.S. 392 (1983); 
Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1981); Hearth, Inc. v. 
Dept. of Public Welfare, 617 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1980); Turpin v. 
Mailet, 591 F.2d 426, 427 (2nd Cir. 1979) (en banc); Cale v. City 
of Covington, 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978); Mahone v. Waddle, 564 
F.2d 1018, 1025 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert, den., 438 U.S. 904 (1978); 
Koska v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 1977). 
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under the available statutory provision is immaterial. 
In the instant case, the Utah State Legislature has provided 
just such a substitute remedy. Plaintiff has available to her the 
adequate statutory remedies under the Utah State Personnel 
Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-1 et sea. (1986 & Supp. 
1992). Rather than seek her relief through that legislatively 
created procedure, the plaintiff has put her statutory cause of 
action "in abeyance" while she asks this Court to create a new 
cause to replace that provided by the legislature. 
The United States Supreme Court addressed this very question 
in Bush v. Lucas. 462 U.S. 386, 103 S.Ct. 2404 (1983), Bush 
involved a federal employee's attempt to have the Court create a 
Bivens type action against the federal government for violations of 
constitutional rights in the federal employment relationship. The 
plaintiff alleged that he had his constitutional rights violated in 
the manner that he was disciplined by his supervisor for 
plaintiff's exercise of his right to free speech. The United 
States Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's argument, finding 
that the legislatively created civil service remedies were an 
adequate substitute remedy. 
The Bush Court, on the federal level, expressly rejected the 
very claim for a direct constitutional tort cause of action that is 
presented by Ms. Alumbaugh. While not binding on this Court's 
interpretation of the Utah Constitution, the State of Utah urges 
this Court to adopt the rationale presented by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, that the civil service remedy was an adequate substitute 
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remedy and that any direct cause of action would be contrary to 
good public policy. 
Indeed, Ms. Alumbaughrs cause of action, if permitted by the 
Court, would be unique. She does not allege that the statutes that 
govern her employment are unconstitutional. She does not allege 
that the procedural provisions of those statutes have not been 
followed in her case. And yet she alleges, without specificity, 
that her rights to due process have been violated. 
If Ms. Alumbaugh claims that the procedures of the applicable 
statutes have not been complied with, and thus her rights to due 
process have been violated, she has a remedy by seeking judicial 
review of the administrative proceeding. On such review, the court 
can easily order the administrative body to comply with the 
procedural requirements of the statutes. 
If, on the other hand, Ms. Alumbaugh claims that the statutes 
themselves do not afford adequate due process, she can challenge 
the constitutionality of the statutes by seeking judicial review of 
the administrative proceeding. Vance v. Fordham 671 P.2d 124 (Utah 
1983). 
IV. PLAINTIFF CANNOT MAINTAIN HER CONTRACT 
CLAIM AGAINST THE STATE 
One of the Legislature's few waivers of immunity relates to 
State contracts. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (1989). But it does not 
apply here. That Section waives immunity only as to the State's 
"contractual obligations]." Since Alumbaugh has no contract with 
the State, but is instead a statutory merit employee of the State 
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of Utah, she cannot invoke that waiver.4 The State's only 
agreement with Dawn Alumbaugh is found in the statutory provisions 
of the Utah State Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-
1 et sea. (1986 & Supp. 1992). 
The Legislature never intended to waive immunity under Section 
63-30-5 except as to one who has privity of contract with the 
government, or who specifically is the contract's intended 
beneficiary. Alumbaugh enjoys no such privity of contract with the 
State. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the performance of a 
duty imposed by statute is insufficient consideration to support a 
contract. . Prows v. State of Utah, 822 P.2d 764, 768 (Utah 1991). 
Alumbaugh cannot use Section 63-30-5 to sue under her alleged 
contract of employment that is, in reality, a claim for statutory 
entitlement. 
Plaintiff is a Career Service employee under the state merit 
system as are all other merit employees in state employment. The 
Utah Legislature has established the laws and the Department of 
Human Resource Management has established the rules (interpreting 
those statutes) upon which Ms. Alumbaugh's employment is based. 
Plaintiff is not a "contract" employee with the State of Utah and 
garners any protection she has in said employment through the 
statutes referred to above, not through a separate employment 
contract. 
* Section 63-30-5 states: "Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligation. 
Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations shall not 
be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 
63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19." 
22 
There is no independent contract between the parties, either 
explicit or implied. If such existed, they are null and void and 
outside the jurisdiction of this Court. In Thurston v. Box Elder 
County, 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992), both parties presented the case 
to the Court on the basis of whether the county had violated its 
personnel manual. The Court, sua sponte, rejected this formulation 
of the issues, and addressed instead whether or not the termination 
of a civil servant had been proper under the applicable statutes. 
The Court expressly held that the county did not have a right to 
alter the statutory provisions that governed its personnel 
policies. 
Jurisdictions which have dealt with this issue have clearly 
enunciated that "public employees" under merit systems maintain 
their positions by laws and rules and not by contract. The Oregon 
Court of Appeals in Personnel Division v. St. Clair, 498 P.2d 809 
(Or. App. 1972) held that: 
Respondent's arguments concerning "vested 
contractual rights" and "impairment of the 
obligation of contracts," in which they 
endeavor to apply the general law of contracts 
to the present case, are based on the 
erroneous assumption that the employment 
relationship between the State of Oregon and 
its civil service employees arises out of, or 
results in, a contract between the parties. 
The terms and conditions of civil service 
employment are fixed by statute and the 
regulations of the state personnel agency, and 
not by "contract" between the public employer 
and the individual employee. 
498 P.2d at 811 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In Smith v. 
City of Newark, 320 A.2d 212 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1974) the Court 
rejected a government employee's contractual claim,, holding that 
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the terms and conditions of public employment are set in 
legislative policy and not in contract. 
In Lamborn v. Jessop, 631 P. 2d 917 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court determined that retention of public office is a 
matter of legislative control, and not a matter of contract. 
Plaintiff relies solely on Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State 
College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981) in support of her claim that a 
civil service employee can state a contractual claim against her 
employer. This reliance is misplaced. Piacitelli involved an 
employee of Southern Utah State College whose employment was 
terminated early in 1980. At that time, officers, faculty, and 
other employees of state universities and other state institutions 
of higher education were expressly, by statute, declared not to be 
civil service merit employees. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-15(1)(g) 
(1986). As the Court pointed out in Piacitelli, "We are, 
therefore, construing a contract, not declaring statutory or 
constitutional rights." JEcL at 1066. Unlike Piapitelli, Dawn 
Alumbaugh is a merit employee, and her employment rights are 
therefore found in the statutes enacted by the legislature, and not 
in any alleged implied contract. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly dismissed Ms. Alumbaugh's complaint 
against the State of Utah's Department of Insurance. The Utah State 
Department of Insurance urges this Court to affirm the trial 
court's order of dismissal. 
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